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Abstract
F aith , language and experience: An analysis o f the 
feeling of absolute dependence
This article deals with the essence of religion proposed 
by Schleierm acher, nam ely ‘the feeling  o f absolute 
dependence upon the Infinite’. In his theory of religious 
experience, and the language he used to express it, he 
claim ed his work to be independent of concepts and 
beliefs. Epistemologically this is incompatible. In our 
century, where Christianity needs to be reinterpreted in 
the light of modern science, Schleiermacher has left us 
with a herm eneutical challenge to com m unicate the 
dynamic experience of a relationship with God in an 
in tellig ib le way. The au tho r argues tha t system atic 
theology’s obligation to rationality must at least include 
a dialectic interplay of in terpretative schemes, events 
and experience.
Communication is sha/ing the wonder o f  experience with other people.
Therefore I  am dedicated to communicate throu^i music.
Leonard Bcmstcin 
(70th Anniversary Concert 1989: Boston Symphony Orchestra)
For the past two centuries, the issue of ‘religious experience’ has been central to the 
work of religious thinkers and scholars of religion. The late eighteenth and the early 
years of the nineteenth century, especially, figure prominently as the period in which 
the desire originated for an accurate description and explanation of that experience
• This paper was read at a post-graduate seminar on ‘Understanding Religious Experience’ at the 
University of Port Elizabeth in October 1989.
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(Proudfoot 1985:xi, 1; cf 196-198).
The em ergence of the concept of religious experience and its centrality for 
religious thought stems largely from the work of the G erm an theologian Friedrich 
Schleierm acher (1768-1834), who m erited the title ‘Pioneer of m odern theology’ 
(C lem ents 1987:7). The explicit aim of his first book On religion - speeches to the 
cultured among its despisers (published in 1799), was to free religious doctrine and 
practice from dependence on metaphysical beliefs and ecclesiastical institutions for 
their justification , and to ground them  in human experience (cf H ebblethw aite 
1972:264). Schleierm acher w rote this book to  convince his friends and fellow 
m em bers of a circle of Rom antic artists, poets, and Berlin critics that their sensi­
bilities w ere m ore in tune with the genuine spirit of religious life than much that 
went on in churches and synagogues.
Schleiermacher’s concept of religion was inspired and shaped, inter alia, by the 
pietistic (M oravian) tradition that nurtured him (cf Proudfoot 1985:224-227), as well 
as by the world of the Enlightenment (the ‘Age of Reason’) into which he was born, 
and against which he took a firm stand. Twenty-two years after his first book, he 
wrote another (for the proposed union of the Lutheran and Reform ed churches in 
Prussia): The Christian Faith: Presented systematically according to the fundamental 
doctrines o f the Evangelical Church. In the second book he provided a more careful 
statem ent of the relation betw een religious doctrine and experience (Proudfoot 
1985:xiii, 16, 31, 238).
Schleierm acher was the earliest and most systematic proponent to appreciate 
religion as an autonom ous and independent m om ent of experience with its own 
integrity - ‘the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, 
in and through the Infinite’ (C lem ents 1987:24, 36). This is a m om ent which is 
irreducible to science or morality, belief or conduct, and in principle invulnerable to 
rational and moral criticism. Any attem pt to assimilate (the essence of) religion in 
scientific or moral paradigms, or any other nonreligious phenom ena, would be an 
attempt to reduce it to something other than it is. For Schleiermacher reductionism 
would thus be the chief e rro r to be avoided in the study of religion (Proudfoot 
1985:xiv, 2-3,6, 9, 233).
His ascription of religion to the realm  of feeling marked the start of modern 
Protestantism ’s habitual emphasis on the knowledge of God as being inward and 
experiential. It was actually part of a whole new (relational) anthropology of human 
existence, in which he offered ‘a positive, new vision of what it is to be truly human, 
in a wholeness, richness and freedom not known by the pa.ssing wisdom of the age’ 
(Clements 1987:36,37).
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The opening chapter o f Proudfoot’s book Religious Experience (which is the 
focal point of this paper) is an examination and criticism of Scleiermacher’s theory 
of religious experience, with particular attention being given to his claim that it is 
independen t of concepts and beliefs, as well as to  his account o f the way that 
experience is expressed in language.
E  Mouton
T H E  DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER O F R E U G IO U S EX PERIENCE 
Schleiermacher was concerned to show the distinctive character o f religion, and to 
p re sen t it in its m ost o rig inal form . U nlike  o rthodox  C hris tian s, Jew s and 
Enlightenment critics who depicted religion as ‘a system of beliefs or doctrines or as 
a moral code prescribing behavior’ (Proudfoot 1985:2; cf C lem ents 1987:8-15), he 
first wanted to show that the religious component in experience has its own integrity, 
by presen ting  an accurate description o f the religious consciousness itself. He 
w anted to show the artists and critics with whom he associated tha t what they 
despised was not religion, but the dogmas and institutions that result from mistaking 
external forms for the inner life of the spirit.
Secondly, Schleierm acher hoped tha t by presenting  religion in its original, 
characteristic form, he would demonstrate the inapplicability of the Enlightenm ent’s 
criticism of religious belief, and especially of Immanuel K ant’s contention that our 
experience is structured by the categories and thoughts we bring to it (cf Hebbleth- 
waite 1972:266; Clements 1987:10,11).
For Schleiermacher ‘descriptive accuracy is to be obtained and reductionism is 
to be avoided by insisting on the immediacy of religious experience, and on its 
radical independence from beliefs and practices. It is a m om ent in hum an ex­
perience which rem ains unstructured by, though it is expressed in thoughts and 
actions’ (Proudfoot 1985:3). Proudfoot (1985:3, 11, 228, 229, 233) finds this theory 
of the immediacy of the religious experience epistemologically inadequate, although 
descriptively accurate. To use Pannenberg’s distinction: ‘Psychologically’ (from the 
subject’s point of view) the experience seems to be im mediate and non-inferential, 
but ‘logically’ (as most contemporary philosophers of religion would agree) it cannot 
be to tally  independen t of concepts, beliefs, g ram m atical rules and linguistic 
practices (cf Van Huyssteen 1986:154-158).
Within the Kantian context a moment of religious experience unstructured by 
the forms and categories of the mind would be no knowledge and would have no 
epistem ological significance. A ccording to  P roudfoot’s evaluation of Schleier­
macher, the fact that G od is always the intentional object o f religious experience 
would implicitly mean that such piety would at least have some cognitive value (cf
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Proudfoot 1985:5, 6 ,11,35).
From a twentieth-century perspective, this immediately brings the complexities 
of hum an communication to the fore. W hen on the subjective side of experience, 
we necessarily  ‘b ring  to  and ex trac t from  experience  a variety  o f a ttitu d es , 
presuppositions, and schemata of interpretation, which change from age to age. Not 
only do our subjective attitudes vary, but also what is to count as an objective event 
varies according to  our interpretative presuppositions’ (H ebblethwaite 1972:265). 
With this in mind, it seems to me that Schleiermacher, if I understand him correctly, 
lost sight of this inevitable aspect of communication.
Schleierm acher also resisted Kant’s identification of religion with morality (in 
term s of reason). In doing so he gave priority to the religious affections. In this 
way he co n tr ib u ted  to  a trad itio n  in which relig ious experience as affective 
experience, and differentiated from both intellect and will, would be regarded as the 
original and characteristic form of religion. In this tradition scholars like William 
Jam es and Rudolf O tto would at least agree that the original and characteristic form 
of religion is a pious consciousness, a sense or feeling that is not to be identified 
with either belief or practice (Proudfoot 1985:7; cf Clements 1987:36-40, 66-107).
T H E  PRIO RITY  O F  T H E  AFFECTIVE M ODE
In his book On Religion Schleierm acher identifies true religion as a sense, an 
affection, an in tu ition , a taste for the Infinite (P roudfoot 1985:9-11; C lem ents 
1987:36). In The Christian Faith he describes this sense more clearly as ‘the feeling 
of to tal or absolute dependence’ (Proudfoot 1985:17-19, 22-23, 31-34; Clem ents 
1987:37). According to him religion, or piety (m an’s yearning for God), is distinct 
from both the theoretical and practical functions of reason (the making of moral 
judgm ents). In opposition  to  the E nligh tenm ent tendency to  rationalism  and 
abstraction (i e the cognitive mode), he views ‘feeling’ (the inward, emotional nature 
of religion) as the means of apprehending God (Clem ents 1987:66). For him the 
point of origin or the essence of religion is neither a way of thinking nor a way of 
acting, neither a set of beliefs nor a collection of practices. It is a m atter of feeling. 
It is directly experienced, not shaped by thought, and is raised above all error and 
misunderstanding (Proudfoot 1985:10-12).
But while Schleierm acher contends that religious experience is immediate and 
independent from thought, this experience includes an intuitive and intentional 
com ponent whose object is the Infinite (cf Clements 1987:37). He keeps on saying 
tha t it is not dependent on concepts and beliefs, yet it can be specified only by 
reference to the concept of the Infinite. This combination is an impossible one: ‘If
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the feeling is intentional, it cannot be specified apart from reference to its object 
and thus it cannot be independent of thought’ (Proudfoot 1985:11; cf 13, 32-36, 237 
footnote 7). A ttitudes, emotions, and beliefs are intentional and always directed 
toward objects. A thought is always a thought of something. Schleiermacher thinks 
that he has identified a mom ent of consciousness independent of thought and yet 
still having cognitive significance. In actual fact his claim functions as a protective 
strategy which precludes any conflict betw een religious belief and the results of 
scientific inquiry (Proudfoot 1985:199-209, 233).
S ince p iety  is an im m ediate  sense, S ch le ie rm acher argues, it canno t be 
understood by description but only by acquaintance, by discovery in oneself (cf Hick 
1969:20-22, 26). Therefore Schleierm acher would direct his listener or reader to 
such a particular moment in his or her own experience (Proudfoot 1985:11-12; cf 36- 
37). The word ‘experience’ by definition implies a first hand, personal acquaintance 
of something. The word itself is derived from the Latin verb ‘experior’, meaning try, 
prove, put to the test, the state of being consciously affected by an event (Hebbleth- 
waite 1972:265).
For Schleierm acher the study of religion and religious thought ought to be 
approached as the attempt to describe that experience through an examination of its 
expressions. One of his criteria for identifying an experience as religious is that it be 
caused or produced by God. ‘The sum total of religion is to feel that our being and 
living is a being and living in and through G od’ (Schleierm acher, as quoted by 
Proudfoot 1985:14). A second criterion for identifying the religious consciousness 
includes reference not only to concepts but also to a specific belief about how the 
experience is to be explained, in spite of Schleierm acher’s insistence that religious 
ideas be restricted to descriptions of religious affections.
To sum m arise, one can say that Schleierm acher’s account of religion as an 
affective state has two components. First, that ideas and principles are foreign to 
religion (which is rather a matter of feeling), distinct from and prior to concepts and 
beliefs, in o th er words pre-linguistic, pre-reflective and there fo re  irreducib le  
(Proudfoot 1985:22, 23, 31). Second, he identifies piety as a sense and taste for the 
Infinite, an identification that requires reference to God, and which also assumes a 
^adgment that this feeling is the result of divine operation. According to Proudfoot 
(1985:15, 32, 33) these components are incompatible: ‘Piety cannot be independent 
of concepts and beliefs and at the same time an intentional state that can only be 
specified by reference to objects o f thought and explanatory claim s’. Schleier­
m acher has mistaken a felt sense of immediacy for a guarantee that piety is not 
formed or shaped by thought or inference (Proudfoot 1985:36; cf 211). Even in his 
later work this incompatibility remains.
EMauíon
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In this regard Hebblethwaite (1972:266) would probably add: ‘To identify some 
experience as an experience of God is to correlate my subjective states, my feelings 
and impressions, with a whole interpretative scheme given to me by my religion’ (cf 
V an H uyssteen 1986:154). By that he does not deny the im portance o f one’s 
subjective state. W hat H ebblethw aite probably m eans is that his interpretative 
scheme makes sense of his subjective experience, and this enables him to construe it 
as an experience of God. This links up with the main thought in John Hick’s striking 
article (1969:25; cf 33-35): ‘To recognise or identify is to experience - as in terms of 
a concept; and our concepts are social products having their life within a particular 
linguistic environm ent.’ Hick offers a theory by which faith is considered ‘the 
in terpre tative elem ent within our cognitive religious experience’ (1969:33) - the 
elem ent ‘within what the religious man reports as his experience of living in the 
presence of God’ (1969:35).
The interpretation is not just read off the experience however, as if experience 
were, in itself, authenticating. Any particular experience, if it is claimed to be an 
experience of God, can only be identified as such within the whole framework of 
interpretation which a given religion provides. In fact, in the case of Christianity it 
is the already in te rp re ted  fact o f Jesus C hrist th a t provides the c rite rion  for 
identifying a specifically Christian experience of God (Hebblethwaite 1972:267, 269; 
cf Van Huyssteen 1986:155,160-162; Hick 1969:32, 33).
In On Religion Schleiermacher gives a rom antic account of religion which had 
its roots in eighteenth-century pietism, but had not been given a clear intellectual 
formulation in that context. He incorporates the insight of the pietists that religion 
is chiefly a matter of the heart, of the affections. But this thesis provides no criteria 
for distinguishing between more or less adequate theological formulations. If the 
essence of piety consists in the immediate relation of the self to the Infinite, how  can 
religious doctrine be critically assessed? (Proudfoot 1985:15, 16).
Schleiermacher addressed this question in his later work. The Christian Faith, in 
which he developed a new theological method. His most im portant contribution, 
according to Proudfoot (1985:16), was to describe the task of systematic theology as 
‘the science that systemizes the doctrine prevalent in a particular community at a 
specific tim e’. But what is that doctrine if it is not a collection of beliefs? ‘The 
subject m atte r of theology is ne ither G od nor evidence o f divine creation and 
governance in the worid but the self-consciousness of the religious believer in the 
context o f his or her community’ (Proudfoot 1985:16; cf Clem ents 1987:37). The 
theologian  is an em piricist, says Schleierm acher, and his aim  is to provide an 
accurate account of the religious affections within a particular community.
‘Religious communities, like individuals, are characterized by their own peculiar
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states of affection. These states are expressed in primary religious language, which 
is the relatively un-self-conscious language of hymns, prayer, personal journals, and 
preaching. The theologian examines this primary language for its coherence and its 
clarity in expressing the religious affections of that community. He then systemizes 
it in the secondary language of his discipline’ (Proudfoot 1985:16).
EUouíon
T H E  FEELIN G  O F ABSOLUTE D EPENDENCE
Schleierm acher’s dual thesis that piety is independent of thought and practice, and 
that it has an intentional object, is made more precise in The Christian Faith. ‘The 
common elem ent in the religious consciousness is now specified not as a sense and 
taste for the infinite, ...but as a feeling of absolute or total dependence upon a 
source or power that is distinct from the world’ (Proudfoot 1985:17, 31-33; Clements 
1987:99-102). Schleiermacher (as quoted by Proudfoot 1985:19; Clements 1987:99) 
puts it this way: ‘The self-identical essence of piety, is this: the consciousness of 
being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with 
G od’. The sense of fmitude is thus being equated with the consciousness of being in 
relation to God.
F a r from  being  a kind of subjectiv ism , the  se lf-consciousness o f which 
Schleierm acher speaks is a consciousness of the self in a relationship - as de te r­
mined by, or acted upon by, what is other than the self. It is the self as well as the 
w hole fin ite  realm  grounded in the Infinite. U ltim ately, the heart of religious 
awareness is our consciousness of the world as the medium through which the infi­
nite G od is acting upon us. It is a sense of ourselves and all else being utterly 
dependent on the Infinite (Clements 1987:37,38).
Piety so defined, however, is certainly not independent of concepts and beliefs. 
To say that the religious person is conscious of being absolutely dependent is to 
attribute to him or her some rather sophisticated concepts and beliefs, including the 
concept of com plete dependence, as well as that of som e source on which he is 
totally dependent. The concept of total dependence assumes at least the concept of 
G od. The content of the concept of God, says Schleiermacher, is derived from the 
im mediate moment of consciousness, rather than the religious consciousness being 
derived from or shaped by the concept of God. The word G od presupposes an idea 
that is ‘nothing more than the expression of the feeling of absolute dependence’ 
(Proudfoot 1985:20, 21; cf 31-32). In Schleiermacher’s view, that would at the same 
tim e m ean tha t G od takes the initiative in im parting faith  and new life to the 
believer (cf Clem ents 1987:55). Religious experience is thus considered the origin 
of religious beliefs and practices, and of models and theories in theology, in which it
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finds its expression, and not vice-versa.
Against this, Hebblethwaite (1972:271; cf 275) would argue that ‘doctrine is not 
rightly understood in terms of some original experience, but in terms of its ability as 
a rationally structured system to make sense of the actual relation between God and 
m an’, that is, to in terp re t experience in a dynamic way. This can obviously only 
happen when the particular framework of in terpretation  (still) communicates life 
and meaning.
Although Schleierm acher does disclaim any attem pt to practise natural theo­
logy, many have criticised him for equating religious experience with a subjective 
feeling th a t has no cognitive com ponent and which may even be a personal or 
cu ltu ral a rte fac t (P roudfoot 1985:21, 22, 31). A part from  the epistem ological 
criticism that can rightly be voiced against Schleiermacher’s theory of religion, one 
has to appreciate his very im portant contribution towards an intensely relational 
view of humanity, and m an’s experience of this reality. He saw ‘that in the face of 
rationalism and post-Christian Romanticism, there was a crucial need to state the 
unique and essential nature of religion as an indelible aspect of human existence, 
not an antique and superfluous adornm ent’ (Clem ents 1987:36). The ‘feeling of 
absolute dependence’ represents that primary mom ent when we are virtually one 
with the object in consciousness, the infinite God.
The feeling of absolute dependence can further only be com m unicated and 
cu ltivated  by hum an fellow ship, one to  ano ther. H ere is one poin t w here in 
Schleierm acher’s case theology and life converge most conspicuously (Clem ents 
1987:37, 38). ‘The religious consciousness, especially, is drawn into a fascination 
with how the Spirit has affected selves in other times and contexts, and in this way 
the self becom es part of a still w ider comm union, educative and enriching, in a 
fellowship where communication takes place even across the centuries’ (Clements 
1987:39).
R E U G IO U S lA N G U A G E  AS EXPRESSION
An integral part o f Schleierm acher’s program m e is the assim ilation of religious 
language to natural and spontaneous expression (Proudfoot 1985:30). His oppo­
sition to reductionism enters his claim that the religious moment in consciousness is 
original. By that he means that (1) it can be accurately described only as a feeling of 
absolute dependence; and (2) it is not an artefact of the constructive activity of the 
mind, and is not dependent on concepts, thoughts, or cultural representations of any 
kind. Religious language derives from the distinctive moment of im mediate self- 
consciousness, and is to be explained by reference to the religious affections, and
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not vice-versa (Proudfoot 1985:23,30-31).
In Schleierm acher’s theory of religious language the expressive function of the 
language is dominant, in so far as it expresses the peculiar piety that is distinctive of 
a particu lar religious community. In his On Religion he (quoted  by Proudfoot 
1985:16) said: ‘Christian doctrines are accounts of the religious affections set forth 
in speech’. But before undertaking to describe and systematise the affections of a 
particu lar religious community, one must clarify how  religious affections are  set 
forth in speech, and how language expresses the self-consciousness of an individual 
or community (Proudfoot 1985:17, 24).
Schleierm acher addresses these questions directly in The Christian Faith. He 
offers a theory by which religious language is to be interpreted and explained by 
reference to the religious affections of which it is the expression. Primary or original 
religious language for him is an extension of natural expression. According to him 
feelings can determ ine speech in e ither of two ways: by manifesting themselves 
naturally and spontaneously in language, or by employing language in reflection 
upon one’s m ental state. The first is a natural expression of piety in speech, the 
second a figurative expression, indicating its object in an indirect v/ay (Proudfoot 
1985:24, 32).
The central thesis of Schleierm acher’s doctrine is that religious language is 
determined by the religious affections and not by antecedent thought. The emotions 
spontaneously manifest themselves in language. All religious emotions will at some 
stage manifest themselves outwardly in the most immediate and spontaneous way by 
m eans of facial fea tu res and m ovem ents of voice and gesture (i e non-verbal 
language), which he regards as their expression. ‘In fact, religious affections may be 
expressed in sacred signs and symbolic acts...without words or thoughts having been 
associated with them at all. They are independent of concepts and thoughts, though 
they naturally express themselves in language’ (Proudfoot 1985:25).
A ccording to A lston (1965:15-34), these kinds of ‘expression’ would not be 
regarded as an adequate and reliable expression of religion. He argues that non­
verbal utterances like squeals, looks, and tones of voice do not express feelings in 
anything like the sense in which they are expressed verbally by interjections or 
declarative sentences in the first person, present tense. In terms of his distinction 
between regularities and rules, he would rather say that non-verbal communication 
shows, dem onstrates, evinces, manifests or betrays (indicates) a certain feeling, but 
that it does not necessarily express it.
My conclusion from A lston’s very meaningful article is that expression as a 
verbal o r non-verbal utterance of religious feeling can only be valid and reliable 
(according to the ‘rule’ of Scripture) when these two (words and deeds) correspond
E  Mouton
HTS 46/3 (1990) 353
FaiUi, language and expcricncc
(c f A lston 1965:21, 23-25, 30, 31), The reliability  o f any kind of m eaningful 
comm unication/expression, to my mind, further depends on the willingness of the 
speaker to be open/honest and sincere, on h is /h er personality type and cultural 
background, h is/her ability to express himself, on the situation/context, and on the 
sensitivity of the hearer/observer.
Schleiermacher further contends that two forms of primary and original speech 
can be identified in every religious community: the poetic and the rhetorical. Poetic 
language results from the natural expression of a mental state, in which the impetus 
for expression comes strictly from within; rhetorical language is elicited  by a 
stim ulus from without. Primary religious language includes both. A third type, 
namely didactic language, is derivative and secondary, and results from the attempt 
to com prehend w hat is given in a direct way in the poetic and rhetorical forms. 
T hese three types of speech com plem ent one ano ther in the expression of the 
underlying religious self-consciousness (C lem ents 1987:134-135). But, Schleier­
m acher concludes, the authority  of doctrinal propositions stems only from the 
religious consciousness that they express and represent (Proudfoot 1985:25, 26).
Schleiermacher has thus offered a theory of religion in which religious language 
and practice are derived from religious experience conceived as feeling, and not the 
other way around. In other words, he claims that the common elem ent in religious 
experience is the feeling  of absolu te dependence. But, as we have seen, that 
necessarily includes reference to a co-determ inant (‘a stimulus from w ithout’) of 
that feeling, a ‘whence’ that is the source of the religious use of the term ‘G od’. For 
him this experience is im m ediate, original, and underived - independent of any 
concepts and beliefs.
To maintain this independence, the distinctive character of doctrine must be 
p roduced  by the relig ious consciousness. S ch le ierm acher can n o t allow  the 
possibility that the common elem ent in religious experience itself derives from or is 
essentially dependent on something else - like the language employed to express it. 
W ere that the case, the descriptive and explanatory priority he attributes to the 
religious consciousness would be compromised. He wants to avoid a reduction of 
the feeling of absolute dependence either by descriptions of that feeling which omit 
reference to its codeterminant, or by purported explanations of piety which portray 
it as consequent upon an tecedent concepts and beliefs (Proudfoot 1985:30, 31). 
This seems to be incompatible.
From a twentieth-century perspective we realise that the wonder of religious 
exf>erience can only be expressed, described and explained in terms of metaphorical 
and relational language, which necessarily depends on the symbolic ability and 
linguistic framework of the one experiencing (cf McFague 1982:1-66; Van Huys-
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S t e e n  1986:151-168). M etaphorical faith language refers to a Reality - which lies 
beyond our intellectual grasp - in a way that is not only expressive, but also explains 
(in a reliable though provisional way) that which has been experienced (Van Huys- 
steen 1986:158-163,176).
EXPRESSIONS AND TH O U G H T
So far we have seen that, according to Schleiermacher, piety is chiefly a m atter of 
feeling - a receptive mode of consciousness which is unstructured by the forms and 
categories of the mind. He argues that religious experience may be expressed in 
thought, but that thought does not constitute the experience. For this programme to 
succeed, religious language and doctrines must be viewed not as assertions or 
judgments, but as extensions of the natural and spontaneous expressions of the sense 
or consciousness, tha t is, prim ary religious language. F o r S ch leierm acher the 
connection between religious consciousness (i e the inner states of an individual or 
religious community) and language is unproblematic. Secondary religious language 
develops out o f an attem pt to understand and in terp re t religious consciousness 
expressed in primary language (Proudfoot 1985:31-34, 43).
Schleierm acher’s thesis that religious language is grounded in and continuous 
with the natural expression of inner states is indeed a complicated one. H e attempts 
to associate religious language with non-linguistic phenomena, yet claims that it can 
develop naturally  to  such a point that it can be considered an account or in ter­
p re ta tio n  of religious consciousness. H e wants to show th a t the language of 
religious belief and doctrine emerges from the religious affections, without being 
contaminated, and it is thus reduced by thoughts and claims about the world, which 
might make it vulnerable to philosophical criticism. The link betw een the direct 
utterances of the religious mom ent and religious language is thus not a logical or 
gram m atical one, but a causal one. His theory of the expressive ch aracter of 
religious language is thus m eant to be an explanation of the em ergence of that 
language (Proudfoot 1985:34,38).
For Schleiermacher religious statements would not be true o r false in the same 
sense th a t e ith e r scientific o r philosophical sta tem ents are (cf H ebblethw aite  
1972:267), bu t they can be assessed for their coherence and the ir adequacy in 
expressing the religious consciousness. Such assessments, Proudfoot (1985:35, 36) 
rightly  argues, assum e th a t they have a logical s tru c tu re  and  th a t re lig ious 
consciousness has a conceptual com ponent. No class of behaviour, including 
linguistic behav iour, can be designated  as expressive w ithout qualifica tion . 
D epending on the context and circumstances in which it appears, it is expressive
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only when it provides evidence that w arrants an inference of some belief, desire, 
em o tion , o r a ttitu d e . To identify  som eth ing  as an expression is to  offer an 
explanation of that phenom enon and regard it as evidence for the ascription of an 
intentional state. For Schleiermacher, though, the feeling of absolute dependence is 
an original moment within the mind which cannot be explained away; for him this is 
of course not an argument for the validity of that feeling (Proudfoot 1985:38, 231).
The recognition that religious language is not only constitutive, but often also 
expressive (shaped by certain affections), remains one of Schleierm acher’s contri­
butions to the study of religion. But it is not only the expressive, receptive medium 
he takes it to be. It also plays a very active and formative role in shaping emotions 
and religious experience (Proudfoot 1985:39, 40, 221; cf H ebblethw aite 1972:267; 
Van Huyssteen 1986:156-158).
Schleierm acher’s strong emphasis on the role of experience in determining the 
content of Christian doctrine would probably qualify for H ebblethw aite’s critique 
(1972:263, 264) on the one-sided appeal to experience which is often found in 
Christology. H e finds the claim  to experience in o rder to establish  C hristian 
doctrine inadequate and insufficient. By analysing the concept of experience and the 
scope of appeals to experience, he shows tha t appeals to C hristian experience 
should never be expected to decide the credibility of Christian doctrine.
Hebblethwaite (1972:264) argues that the widespread tendency to take refuge in 
appeals to experience - after the collapse of the old authorities of Scripture and 
tradition - has been too hasty. That is not the only resort when the old authorities 
have gone. In his article (1972:268, 275, 278) he suggests a positive alternative 
c rite r io n  of ra tio n a lity , nam ely, an appeal to  the ‘inner ra tio n a le ’ (w hich I 
understand as the determining ‘cosmological perspective’ or life and world view - cf 
Rousseau 1986:57-63, 400-414) of the interpretative scheme of Christian doctrine, 
that is, its dynamic and creative ability to interpret experience in an intelligible way.
CONCLUSION
The concept of religion and the idea of religious experience are both products of 
m odem . W estern, largely Christian, thought of the past three centuries. They have 
developed during a period in which Christianity has been criticised and rein ter­
preted  in the light of m odern science, the recognition of the varieties of religious 
be lie f and p rac tice  in o th er cultures, and the collapse o f the appeal to  such 
traditional authorities as metaphysics, scripture, and ecclesiastical pronouncements 
(Proudfoot 1985:232).
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S ch le ierm acher’s argum ent for the autonom y o f religious experience is a 
protective strategy built on an erroneous separation of religious life from ordinary 
belief and inquiry, which resulted in an artificial block to inquiry, and which would 
normally serve an apologetic purpose. TTiis resulted in the use of ambiguous terms 
like ‘im m ediate’, ‘original’, ‘sense’, and ‘experience’, each of which can be read in 
such a way as to capture the experience from the subject’s point of view and remain 
neutral to the proper explanation of the experience (Proudfoot 1985:233,234).
Schleierm acher and his followers left us with the herm eneutic challenge to 
comm unicate the dynamic experience of a relationship with G od in a  way that will 
be intelligible, that will bring LIFE and make sense to all peoples and cultures of 
our tim e. The discussion has at least m ade us aw are of the im portance of an 
ongoing critical reflection on what we understand as ‘religious experience’. With 
our twentieth century knowledge of the multifaceted nature and interrelatedness of 
human communication, we today realise that the subject of biblical hermeneutics is 
a complex one (cf Rousseau 1986:19-74). The ongoing reflection will thus at least 
have to include a continuous critical look at faith as the interpretative scheme of 
every church and individual, which should encourage us continuously to develop and 
rewrite Christian doctrine (cf Van Huyssteen 1986:154-163; H ebblethwaite 1972: 
269).
Instead of appealing to experience alone for either establishment, refutation or 
just the keeping alive of religious language and doctrine, the answer probably lies in 
the dialectic interplay of (1) previous interpretative schemes, (2) particular events 
(like the C hris t even t - cf H ick 1969:34), and (3) the individual and group  
experience of the early church as well as our community today (cf Hebblethwaite 
1972:267-278; Van Huyssteen 1986:177-187). This could be a meaningful part of an 
ongoing ‘cum ulative argum ent’ which might lead to explain in an increasingly 
adequate  and credible way why it makes sense to believe in the living G od (cf 
Proudfoot 1985:43, 63, 69-74, 216-227).
In o ther w ords - as C hristian  believers we live in the constan t hope and 
expectation  tha t the Spirit of G od will continuously inspire us to find relevant 
methods and theories which will bring us nearer to experiencing and expressing in a 
valid and plausible way som ething of the paradox of religious experience - that 
which in actual fact is beyond our understanding.
£ Mouíon
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